장바구니 담기 close

장바구니에 상품을 담았습니다.

장바구니로 계속쇼핑하기
The Institutionalisation of U.S.-style Disclosure Practices in the Corporate Governance System of South Korea
미리보기

The Institutionalisation of U.S.-style Disclosure Practices in the Corporate Governance System of South Korea

  • MINHYE ZOH
  • |
  • 통독원
  • |
  • 2021-08-30 출간
  • |
  • 264페이지
  • |
  • 152 X 225mm
  • |
  • ISBN 9791190540377
판매가

22,000원

즉시할인가

19,800 원

배송비

2,300원

(제주/도서산간 배송 추가비용:3,000원)

추가상품
상품선택
독서대 7,900원 독서대 선택안함 0원
수량
+ -
총주문금액
19,800원
장바구니 구매하기

※ 스프링제본 상품은 반품/교환/환불이 불가능하므로 신중하게 선택하여 주시기 바랍니다.

북스크린영상으로 만나보는 한 권의 책 이야기

목차

국문초록
List of Tables
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
Author’s Preface

Chapter 1 _ Corporate Governance Institutionalisation of South Korea

South Korea’s Corporate Governance Institutionalisation since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997

Mandatory versus Enabling Corporate Governance Framework:
Institutional and Agency Perspective

Objectives

Structure of the Volume


Chapter 2 _ Understanding Corporate Governance: Disclosure, Board of Directors, and Scandal

Corporate Governance:
Rules, Practices and Processes to Direct and Manage a Company

Information Asymmetry and Conflict of Interest

Disclosure in OECD Principles of Corporate Governance:
The Only Legal Obligation

How Disclosure Principles Evolved between 1999 and 2015

Responsibilities of the Board in OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: Ultimate Decision-Makers

Types of Corporate Scandals as a result of Information Asymmetry Impact of Corporate Scandals: Examples from the U.S. and Korea

Remarks

Chapter 3 _ Relationships between Issuer, Investor and Regulator under
Enabling and Mandatory Corporate Governance Regimes:
The Institutional and Agency Perspective

Enabling and Mandatory Corporate Governance Regimes and Key Players

Triangle Relationship under an Enabling Corporate Governance Regime

Triangle Relationship under a Mandatory Corporate Governance Regime

Institutionalisation of Different Corporate Governance Regimes Types of Institutions

Institutionalising Formal and Informal Corporate Governance

Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions under an Enabling Regime

Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions under a Mandatory Regime

Agency Problems under Different Corporate Governance Regimes

Principal and Agent Relationship under an Enabling Regime

Principal and Agent Relationship under a Mandatory Regime

Remarks


Chapter 4 _ Three-part Methodology

Qualitative Research Design: Comparative Research

Macro-level Institutional Analysis of Corporate Disclosure Practices in Korea

Micro-level Comparative Legal Analysis of Korean and U.S. Corporate Disclosure Practices

Comparative Legal Case Analysis of Corporate Scandals and the Effect of Disclosure Practices in Korea and the U.S.

Remarks


Chapter 5 _ Macro-level Institutional Analysis of Corporate Disclosure Practices in Korea



Institutional Setting of Korea’s Capital Market 1960-1997:
Exclusive Relationship between Regulators and Issuers

Government-Led Growth Strategy 1960s and 1970s:
Regulator as Controlling Person

Chaebol-Led Growth Strategy 1980s and 1990s:
Issuer as Controlling Person

Implications of Korea’s Missing Corporate Governance 1960-1997

Change of Institutional Setting:
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the IMF’s Role as External Regulator

Corporate Governance-related Factors that Induced the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 in Korea

Introduction of an ‘External’ Regulator:
Role and Use of the IMF by the Korean Government

Korean Government’s Letters of Intent to the IMF:
Undertakings to Enhance Corporate Governance

Korea’s Ongoing Adoption of U.S. Mandatory Corporate Governance Practices Post-1997

Phase 1 (1997-2008): Revision of Korea’s Securities and Exchange Act as per the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Phase 2 (2007-Present): Promulgation and Revision of Korea’s Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act as per the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, and Dodd-Frank Act of 2010

Revision of the Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance as per U.S. Legislation

Remarks


Chapter 6 _ Micro-level Comparative Legal Analysis of Korean and U.S. Corporate Disclosure Practices

Comparison of Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms in Business Reports

Similar Disclosure of Financial Data Required in the U.S. and Korea


Lacking Disclosure of Non-Financial Data in Korea

Lacking Disclosure of Corporate Governance Information in Korea

Penal Provisions against Corporate Executives for False or Non-Disclosure
Remarks


Chapter 7 _ Comparative Legal Case Analysis of Corporate Scandals and the Effect of Disclosure Practices in Korea and the U.S.

Major Characteristics of Corporate Scandals in the U.S.
and Korea 2000-2018

U.S. More False Disclosure vs. Korea More Non-Disclosure

Different ‘Types’ of False or Non-Disclosure in the U.S. vs. Korea

Repetition of Corporate Scandals by the Same Issuer in the U.S. and Korea 2000-2018

Two in the U.S. vs. Five in Korea of Issuer Repeating a Corporate Scandal

U.S.-Specific Repetition of Corporate Scandals: Inter-Category Link

Korea-Specific Repetition of Corporate Scandals:
Inter-Category Link

Punishment on Executives for Committing a Corporate Scandal in the U.S. and Korea 2000-2018

Majority of U.S. Issuers Fined vs. No Korean Issuer Fined

Majority of U.S. Executives Fined vs. Less than Half of Korean Executives Fined

Every U.S. Executive Served more than 50% of Sentence vs. More than Half of Korean Executives Served 0%

Korea-specific Reduced Penalties:
Suspended Term and Presidential Pardons

U.S. Executives after committing a Corporate Scandal:
Prohibition to serve as Director or Officer

Korean Executives after committing a Corporate Scandal:
Majority of Executives returned to Office

Implications of Punishments on Executives for Committing a Corporate Scandal in the U.S. and Korea

Remarks


Chapter 8 _ Conclusion: Korea’s Corporate Governance Institutionalisation

How did Korea Institutionalise Corporate Disclosure Practices?
An Institutional Analysis

To what extent did Korea incorporate U.S.
Corporate Disclosure Practices? A Comparative Legal Analysis

How Effective are Korean and the U.S.
Corporate Disclosure Practices in reducing Corporate Scandals?
A Comparative Legal Case Analysis

Application to Economies that received the IMF Bailout Package


Bibliography
추천포스트

교환 및 환불안내

도서교환 및 환불
  • ㆍ배송기간은 평일 기준 1~3일 정도 소요됩니다.(스프링 분철은 1일 정도 시간이 더 소요됩니다.)
  • ㆍ상품불량 및 오배송등의 이유로 반품하실 경우, 반품배송비는 무료입니다.
  • ㆍ고객님의 변심에 의한 반품,환불,교환시 택배비는 본인 부담입니다.
  • ㆍ상담원과의 상담없이 교환 및 반품으로 반송된 물품은 책임지지 않습니다.
  • ㆍ이미 발송된 상품의 취소 및 반품, 교환요청시 배송비가 발생할 수 있습니다.
  • ㆍ반품신청시 반송된 상품의 수령후 환불처리됩니다.(카드사 사정에 따라 카드취소는 시일이 3~5일이 소요될 수 있습니다.)
  • ㆍ주문하신 상품의 반품,교환은 상품수령일로 부터 7일이내에 신청하실 수 있습니다.
  • ㆍ상품이 훼손된 경우 반품 및 교환,환불이 불가능합니다.
  • ㆍ반품/교환시 고객님 귀책사유로 인해 수거가 지연될 경우에는 반품이 제한될 수 있습니다.
  • ㆍ스프링제본 상품은 교환 및 환불이 불가능 합니다.
  • ㆍ군부대(사서함) 및 해외배송은 불가능합니다.
  • ㆍ오후 3시 이후 상담원과 통화되지 않은 취소건에 대해서는 고객 반품비용이 발생할 수 있습니다.
반품안내
  • 마이페이지 > 나의상담 > 1 : 1 문의하기 게시판 또는 고객센터 1800-7327
교환/반품주소
  • 경기도 파주시 문발로 211 1층 / (주)북채널 / 전화 : 1800-7327
  • 택배안내 : CJ대한통운(1588-1255)
  • 고객님 변심으로 인한 교환 또는 반품시 왕복 배송비 5,000원을 부담하셔야 하며, 제품 불량 또는 오 배송시에는 전액을 당사에서부담 합니다.